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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
I~~\ Y TANNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v~. 
LTAH POULTRY & FARMERS 
COOPERATI\TE, a corporation, 
GEORGE RUDD AND CHARLES 
P. RUDD, 




PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Come no"\Y the Defendants and Respondents and 
respectfully 1nove this court for a rehearing on the 
appeal herein and the decision on the same and urgP 
the follo,Ying error in support of the n1otion. 
1. There was no ambiguity in the Release. 
2. If it is necessary to look beyond the Release for 
contemporaneous writings relating to its meaning, those 
are already before the court in the cover letters admit-
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ted in the answers to the defendants' Interrogatories to 
the plaintiff. 
3. There is additional consideration to uphold the 
Release. 
4. Payment of the conceded part of an unliquidated 
or disputed claim is consideration. 
5. The $4,000 sued for in the fifth cause of action 
establishes that the claim was disputed. 
6. The court's reversal is too broad- while holding 
that the Release is limited to the 1951 crop, the Court 
reverses the judgment of the lo\Yer court and allo\YS the 
plaintiff to sue for $4,000 more for that crop. 
BRIEF ON PETITIOX 
It is with considerable trepidation that this n1otion 
for a rehearing is submitted because the decision sought 
to be reconsidered \Yas a unanilnous one and because five 
judges of \vide experience, learning and integrity united 
in that decision. But it is thought that there is Yital 
evidence for \Yhich the case is being sent back to the 
lower court, that is no\v before this court and \Yhich has 
been overlooked. And the engaging thought that tllis 
case can be disposed of by the fact that the eonsidera _ 
1. ion, \vlrirh the plaintiff received \lras only \Yhat l~e "~as 
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entitled to, does not solve the problem because such 
consideration is actually held to be sufficient and ade-
quate as noted by \Villiston and other authorities. 
For a reappraisal of these matters this motion for 
rehearing is submitted. 
AMBIGUITY IN THE RELEASE 
r~rhe court concludes that there \Yas ambiguity in the 
Release because it was stated therein that the $9,350.06 
\Yas the balance o"\ving under the marketing of the 1951 
crop of turkeys and this court then says that: 
". . . This would suggest that the release deals 
"vith the obligations of the Cooperative arising 
out of its Inarketjng Tanner's 1951 crop of tur-
keys.' (First paragraph at the top of page 2 of 
the decision.) 
As the court says in the next sentence that, while 
the release does not confine its scope to the 1951 opera-
tions, 
'~it clearly suggests that such was the intention 
of the parties." 
The Release expressly covers a discharge from: 
"any and all debts, claims, demands and account-
ings of \\·hatsoever name, nature and descrip-
tion. . . . " 
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It covers all debts, all claims, all demands and all 
accountings. Then to make it more certain that every""' 
thing 'va.s included, there is added, 
" ... of whatsoever name, nature and description." 
Isn't the statement in the court's opinion; "vVhile the 
words dealing with the Release do not confiJ1e it strictly 
to the obligations arising out of the 1951 marketing .... " 
a gross understatement? Do the 'Yords ''any and all 
debts" etc, confine the meaning at all? Do those 'vords 
restrict the meaning in any 'yay? Of course, they don't. 
The only restriction, the only confinen1ent that is 
found in the Release follo''Ts these boundless, all eln-
hracing 'vords : 
"of "rhatsoever nan1e, nature and description" 
'"'hen there is added: 
"exceptin __ r; ouly that I reserYe the right to receive 
as the san1e may become due, "-hateYer smns n1ay 
be paid from tin1e to ti1ne under the certificates 
of interest issued to n1e and under the letters to 
n1e fron1 the Cooperative adYising n1e that certain 
credit~ hn.Y0 been retained.~' ( En1phasis added.) 
Hl1~xet\pting Only". That is the only restriction found 
in this broad, li1nitless Re1ea8e. ,, ... here in the ,Yords 
which follo'v "Excepting 0 nly'' is there any confine1nent 
of those all inclusive "Tords ''any and all debts, claiozs, 
den1n1uls and rrcco1ndi·ng·~ to r.lainu~ arising fron1 the 
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marketing of the 1951 crop~ There is no confinement, 
no restrieiion and no reservation "exoepting only" the 
right to receive any future payments made on certificates 
of inter(~~t already issued and retains described in advises 
of credit. 
How could it have more clearly stated that "any 
an.d all debts" meant all debts and not just those for 
1951 '? Would the addition of the words "from the be-
ginning of tin1e to the present'' really have added any-
thing to "any an,d all debts"~ 
Does this court 'vant to go on record that it is 
necessary to add "from the beginning of time to the 
present" in order to make a release of ''all debts'' mean 
\\~hat it ~ays-Hall debts''? Especially when the broad, 
all-inclusive 'vords are follo,ved by: 
• • t• 0" 1 " 
... excep 1nb on y ... 
and the claims excepted from this broad, all-inclusive 
language do not n_ame the claims arising from dealings 
In p~r1or years. 
The holding of this court that so clear-cut a statc-
Inent as "any and all debts ... of ,, ... hatsoever nanlP, 
nature and description excepting only .... " is ambiguous, 
is to cloud the la-\v of this state and \Yill force this court, 
in future decisions, to qualify such holding until it is 
eroded aY.-ny a11d it is finally adjudged that the release 
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of "all debts ... of \vhatsoever name, nature and descrip-
tion" means exactly what it says. 
IF IT IS NECESSARY TO LOOK BEYOND TI-IE RE-
LEASE FOR ITS INTERPREITATION, THE SECONDARY 
EVIDENCE IS ALREADY BEFORE THE COURT. 
This court, after holding the words, ". . . . any and 
all debts ... of whatsoever narne, nature and descrip-
tion. . . ." are ambiguous and might 1nean only those 
arising frorn the 1951 crop, says that other evidence 
of the intent is admissible and cites ·Continental Bank 
v. Bybee (6 Utah 2nd 98, 306 P. 2nd 773). There this 
court held that if the instrument \vas arnbiguous and 
the uncertainty could not be cleared up "ithin the "'four 
corners of the instrun1ent itself" that evidence should 
be adnlitted of '~other conternporaneous \Yritings con-
cerning the same subject rnatter'~ ( 306 P. 2nd 773 ). 
1 t is not necessary to send the case back to ascertain 
these facts nor that intent. The lo\ver court srn11111arized 
its findings on this subject in paragraph nun1bered 2 
of the findings-portion of its "Tritten judgrnent and 
particularly in subparagraphs j and k of paragraph 2. 
This court has all that evidence before it no"T· 
In the letter to the plaintiff dated Septen1ber 2, 
1952 (Tr. 110) it \Yas stated that the settlen1ent (un-
nlunbered ~h0et bet\veen Tr. 98 and 99) o:n the 1951 cro~) 
l. 
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\\'as enclosed and explained it. Then reference was there 
Inade to plaintiff's letter of August 25, 1952 (Tr. 100) 
detnanding the right: 
". . . to inspect the records concerning all busi-
ness transactions between the Association and 
myself for the past three years . ... "; (emphasis 
added.) 
and threatening: 
"to institute the necessary proceedings in a court 
of law to obtain the records .... 
"It is my sincere desire that you respond as 
requested upon receipt of this demand; thus 
avoiding expenses and unnecessary litigation.'' 
Returning again to the letter of Septe1nber 2, 1952 (Tr. 
110) addressed to the plaintiff on behalf of the defend-
ants, attention is called to the fact that: 
"You have had your auditors inspect our 
records on t\\~o occasions for a total of three or 
four days in all and on each one your auditors 
'vere given access to all of the records they 
desired .... However, in view of the accountings 
furnished from time to time to your attorneys 
and the records made available to your different 
auditors on their inspections, I believe' that you 
·w·ill agree 'vith me that the blanket demand to 
be subject to audit is not ti1nely. If, ho,vever, 
there is information to \vhich you are entitled, 
\\~ith \vhich you have not been favored, it "~ill 
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be furnished upon request, or your auditors "?ll 
be permitted to inspect the records. yY e ':111, 
therefore, await your further \Yord on this point. 
''Under the circumstances I believe that we 
' should ask that you satisfy yourself as to the 
completeness and honesty of our accounting be-
fore we pay the balance of the funds due you 
under such accounting. I am therefore asking the 
Bank to present a receipt for your execution if 
you are to use the check, a copy of ''Tlrich receipt 
is enclosed herewith. 
~'If you are \Yilling to accept the check under 
these limitations, please do so, or if you do not, 
please return the check to the c;ooperative.'' 
Another conten1poraneous \\'Titten instrun1ent \Yas a 
letter (Tr. 112) to the Far1ners and ~Ierchants Bank, 
also of Septe1nber ~' 193:2 in ''Thich the $9,350,06 check, 
payable to the plaintiff and to the bank, \v·as enclosed. 
Reference is made to the "'seyeral de1nands for account-
ing fro1n us .... " made by l\Ir. Tanner and the end of 
the seeond paragraph reads : 
""But so that this n1atter 1nay be at rest, I an1 
0nclosing a Re1Pa~e for his signature. 
, "Please do not cash the enclosed check or 
deliver the san1e to l\Ir. Tanner until he has 
executed the enclosed Release in duplicate. r; pon 
such execution, please have it \YitnessPd and for-
\Ya l'd both copies thereof to Ine, and deliver the 
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check. If ~Ir. Tanner refuses to execute the 
Release, please return the check to me." 
The plaintiff, in his answer to our Interrogatory No. 24, 
admits that he received a copy of this letter to the bank. 
If there is need for further examination of con-
temporaneous communications between the parties, there 
are the two reports of the auditors of the plaintiff, one 
(Tr. 103) dated August 21, 1952 (four days before the 
pre-emptory demand by plaintiff for all of our records 
for the last three years and the threat of litigation if 
thf\y 'vere not furnished) in which Mr. lVIann stated 
that the investigation on "'"hich he 'vas then reporting 
covered the 1949 crop and the report of the investigation 
is set forth quite at length. This report ends 'vith the 
caution: 
'' 1Iore work by me for your account should 
not be done, in my opinion, until you have had 
time to think over the information in this letter 
and we have met and talked further with Mr. 
Lamoreaux "rho is getting a copy of this letter." 
..:\nd then there is the final report ( Tr. 105) dated one 
month after the defendant's tender of the Release and 
1; the $9,350.06 in 'vhich ~lr. l\fann begins: 
''Having spent quite some time at the office 
of the Utah Poultry and the 1~tah Ice it is my 
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feeling I had better report my findings to date 
and let you decide the future course. 
"Utah Poultry supplied me "\\rith all inven-
tories and supporting data for the three years, 
1949, 1950, and 1951. When I sa"\V the amount 
of "\vork involved in checking the items out, I 
decided to concentrate on 1950 at present, as I 
told you over the phone." 
Then follows a detailed report concerning the results 
of investigation of the 1950 crop and again there is the 
caution in the closing sentence of the report (Tr. 109): 
'~Perhap~s you \Yill want to have a n1eeting 
now "\vith .i\lr. Lamoreaux and 1nyself to discuss 
possible further procedures." 
Other conten1poraneous letters \vhich thro\v light 
on this include the one fron1 ~fr. Lan1oreaux to the 
plaintiff dated August 11, 193:2 (Tr. 1~0) \\'"herein the 
plaintiff's attorney reports concerning the three erop 
years-1949 to 1951. This attorney for the plaintiff 
closes his letter \vith the somber staten1ent: 
HIt is n1y judgn1ent that they \vill giYe sonle-
thing of an accounting next \Veek after "~hieh 
ti1ne "Te "\Yill have soinething tangible upon ·zch ich 
to procrrd." (En1phasiB added) 
If a still "TidPr inYt..\stigation is sought for eonten1por-
aneous "\\'Titings, then see the letter fron1 the attorney for 
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the plaintiff, nfr. Brockbank, dated June 24, 1952 (Tr. 
116) in \\~hich this attorney accepts the defendant's 
statement that the plaintiff did not market his turkeys 
through the defendants, but sold his 1949 crop of turkeys 
outright to the Utah Poultry. Plaintiff's attorney then 
asks for information concerning the 1950 and 1951 crops 
and specifically 'vhen and to whom they were sold and 
the charges 1nade for processing, eviscerating, storage, 
interest and insurance. 
All of this information was before the lower court 
'vhen it reached the conclusion that the release applied 
to all claims, not just those relating to 1951. This same 
information is available to this court and clearly shows 
what the issue was between the parties-that the defend-
ants wished to get through with the agitation and threat 
of litigation and to lay at rest all matters be"\\"een the 
parties. 
,~1 If further evidence is needed by the court to clef-
ill ini tely ascertain that ". . . . any and all debts . . . . of 
whatsoever name, nature, and description .... " in the Re-
lease meant just \\"'hat it: said, and not the mere 1951 
crop, observe the five weeks that intervened between 
the dispatch of this $9,350 check and its acceptance . 
IT 
.:\nd during that five weeks, the plaintiff sent his auditors 
in, not to cheek out the 1951 records as this court felt 
might be the case, but the 1950 records, as evidenced 
by j!r. ~Iann's report of October ~, 1952 (Tr. 105). 
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This was not a Release which \Yas accepted \Yithout 
adequate counsel, for plaintiff was being advised not 
only by ~1:r. Brockbank (Tr. 116) but also by ~Ir. Lam-
oreaux, \vho reported to Plaintiff on August 11, 1952 
(Tr. 120) and to whom reference is made by the auditor 
in his two reports (Tr. 104 and Tr. 109). Both of these 
attorneys were furnished copies of tl1e t\YO letters of 
September 2, 1952 (See bottom of Tr. 111 and Tr. 112 
for notations of persons to \\rhom copies \Vere sent). 
It is respectfully submitted that the Release is not 
ambiguous but that " ... and all debts ... of \Yhat-
soever name, nature and description ... "means exactly 
\\'"hat is says and that this is borne out by the contempor-
aneous \vritings by the parties during the period in ques-
tion, and by the failure of the plaintiff to add to the 
exceptions fro1n the scope of the Release, clain1s \Yhich 
arose fron1 earlier years' transactions, if he or his la\Y-
yers had in n1ind that they \\"'"ere holding out c.lainlS 
additional to those specifically 1nentioned in the R-elease 
as being 0xcepte(l fron1 the tt}rn1s thereof. 
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION TO UPHOLD RELEASE 
In addition to the settle1nent of an unliquidated 
and of a di8pntPd clain1, there is other consideration 
"·hi~h ronrts hav0 frequently· used to su8tain relea~es. 
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DEFENDANTS PERFORMED AN ACT NOT OBLIGATORY 
In 12 Am. J ur., Section 80, page 57 ..t-, it is stated: 
''Perfor1nance of an aet by a promisee which 
he is not legally obligated to perform is suf-
ficient consideration for a promise, since it is a 
legal detriment irrespective of \vhether it is an 
actual detri1nent or loss to him.'' See 1 \\rilliston, 
Con tracts Revised ( 8 vol.) Ed. Sec. 121, page 423. 
Defendants were under no obligation to pay the 
$9,350.06 to plaintiff until a release of the Bank's second 
n1ortgage had been furnished to defendant. There was 
no duty to issue a check \vith the names of both the 
plaintiff and the bank (as \Yas done-see fourth para-
graph of the letter of September 2, 1952, from Defend-
ants to Plaintiff, Tr. 110) and to make the same avail-
able to plaintiff. But defendants did so in eonjunction 
"yith their offer to rPlease that check to the plaintiff 
and the bank upon the execution and delivery of the 
Release in question. That offer vvas accepted by plain-
tiff hy executing and delivering the Release. 
There \\yas sufficient and adequate consideration 
to sustain the Release in question. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
B 
BENEFIT TO PLAINTIFF 
In the much quoted U. S. Supreme Court case of 
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. ·Clark, 178 
U. S. 353, 44 L. Ed. 1099 this authority, after stating that 
the compromise of a liquidated, undisputed claim by 
the payment of a smaller su1n is unavailing as considera-
tion for a release, goes on to add that -w .. hile this rule 
is \Veil settled, 
4
' •••• it is considered so far "\Yith disfavor as to 
be confined strictly to cases \Yithin it" ( 4-± L. Ed. 
1105, middle right column 178 l"'". S. 365, top) ; 
and just belo\v this quote~ the court adds: 
... In Johnson v. Brannan, 5 Johns. 268, 271, 
it "\Yas referred to as 'that rigid and rather un-
reasonable rule of the old la,v' "; 
and further quotes fro1n eases critical of such a rule 
'vhere, in one of then1, l\f r. Justice N" elson of the Supren1e 
Court of N e\\~ York said of the rule that it: 
B '. • • • is technical and not ver~~ \\~ell supported 
by reason. Courts therefore haYe departed fron1 
it upon slight distinctions.' " (end of the para-
graps juRt referred to, -!--1- L. Ed. 1105 17~ lT ~ 
' ~ . ..... . 
::1(15) 
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And the Supreme Court in the Clark case further quotes 
from Brook~ v. \vnite, 2 nfet. 283, 37 Am. Dec. 95, "\Vhere 
the ~{assaehusetts court criticizes the doctrine and states: 
4 
• Hence judges have been disposed to take 
out of its application all those cases "\vhere there 
"\\ras any new consideration, or any collateral 
benefit received by the payee, "\vhich may raise a 
technical legal consideration although it "\vas quite 
appal'ent that such consideration was far less than 
the amount of the sum due·." ( 44 L. Ed. 1105, 178 
lT. S. 365, end of page in both) 
In 1 Am. Jur., Section 53, page 245, this exception 
to the general rule is treated thusly: 
44 In a number of instances, it has been held, 
in the case of a liquidated demand, that the giving 
of the debtor's negotiable note or cheek to the 
creditor is a benefit to the latter, and that there-
fore, if the creditor receives the debtor's note 
or check for an amount less than is owing in full 
satisfaction of his claim, it is a good accord 
and satisfaction." (Citations) 
This authority then discusses some cases cri1tical of 
the doctrine just referred to and then at the bottom of 
the same page, discusses the consideration as follo·wrs: 
( 1 Arn . .J ur. p. 24~) 
"From a practical standpoint it "\vould seem 
almost self-evident that the note is of less value 
than the cash, yet this might not al,vays be true, 
as "\\rhere the note bears interest. But the reason 
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why the note might constitute a good consider-
ation \\Thile the cash might not is the same as 
that ~iven by rthe courts \vhere 'a chattel, \Vhich 
may be of little value is the consideration for 
the discharge. The co~rts will not go into the 
question of the value of the consideration in the 
lat~ter class of cases, but will assume that the 
chattel had a value to the creditor sufficient to 
sup·port the agreement, else he \\~auld not have 
made it." 
In 1 C.,J.S. at page 496, it is said: 
"Even where the rule [of Pinnel's Case, 5 
Coke 117a, 77 Reprint 237] is firmly established, 
ho\vever, it is regal"ded \\"'ith disfavor having re-
peatedly been criticized as teclmical, harsh and 
of doubtful validity, and it is accordingly followed 
\Vith reluctance in many instances and is strictly 
confined by the courts to cases falling within its 
terms and reason. ~Ioreover, a number of excep-
tions to the rule are recognized. . . . and it has 
been said that the 1noden1 tendency of the eourts 
is to enlarge the exceptions, in order to avoid the 
har~hness of the rule and to carry se-ttle1nents, 
adjustn1ents and co1npro1nises into effect.~, 
In addi~tion to the consideration arising from the 
settle1nent of a dispute and the settleinent of an un-
liquidated debt, there i~ this consideration in defPndants' 
offpr \Yhieh plaintiff accepted: 
The plaintiff had 1no~tgaged tllis erop of turkeys to 
the Farn1ers and l\lerehan ts Bank of Provo, ns indica ted 
in the Jetter to ])efendants (Tr. 110). 
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rrheir's \Ya~ a second mortgage. The Far1ners and 
~r()rchants Bank of Provo is the one so named in the 
letter (Tr. 11:2), a copy of \vhich plaintiff admits receiv-
ing in hi:-; ans\ver to Interrogatory K o. 24. It \vas to that 
bank that the check and Release were sent. 
Defendants "\\rere under no obligation to pay over 
the $9,350.06 surplus arising from the sale of the 1951 
turkeys, to either plaintiff or the bank. Until the latter 
t\YO, jointl~~, made demand for the money, specifying 
the proportion to \vhich each \vas entitled or plaintiff 
and the bank litigated their respective claims, defendants 
could only pay at their peril. 
The defendants tendered payment of ~the $9,350.06 
on multiple-payee check if the Release in question was 
signed by plaintiff (Tr. 111 and 112.) Plaintiff accepted 
the offer and signed the Release. 
The Plaintiff benefited: 
a. by getting immediate payment of $9,350.06 instead 
of suffering a delay until the matter could be litigated 
or proof produced to satisfy as to the respective rights 
of the parties in the surplus1 that is, by paying before 
it \\~as due (Note 2, 1 \Villiston on Contracts, Section 121, 
page -±~3), and 
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b. by avoiding the necessity of litigating the issue 
as to what was due Bank and what \Yas due Plaintiff, 
and 
c. by avoiding the necessity of going to the bank 
and then to defendants to get this sum. 
Even though the court should hold that the settle-
ment of the dispute between the plaintiff and defendants 
as to whether the amount owing was $9,350.06 as claimed 
by defendant or $4,000 more than that as claimed by 
plaintiff in his fifth cause of action, was insufficient 
consideration, and even though the court should hold 
that the settlement of the unliquidated amounts as to the 
sums received on each of the sales, as to the charge for 
each hundreds of purchases of supplies, and as to the 
charges for processing, eviscerating, freight, storage, etc., 
"~as not consideration, yet there \Yas consideration for 
the Release in the tender of a check for the $9,350.06. 
PAYMENT OF CONCEDED PART OF CLAIM AS 
CONSIDERATION 
Payment of the conceded part of a disputed or un-
liquidated claim is generally held to be valid considera-
tion for a release of the entire clai1n. 
'~On the other hand, the tendencv of the later 
rases, evidently influenced by a desire to avoid 
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the rigid and unjust rule of the old la\Y, seems to 
be to sustain the discharge \vhere there is a dis-
pute as to an~~ part of the elai1n made hy the 
creditor, although the 11ayment is only of the 
s1naller amount ''Thich ,,~as conceded by the debtor 
to be due. In other \Vords, the general rule that 
acceptance of a part of an indebtedness \vith a 
pro1nise to discharge the \Vhole is not binding 
does not apply \\'"here there is a dispute as to 
\\'"hether a larger or smaller amount is due, al-
though the payment upon receipt of which the 
promise to release is made is only the smaller 
amount conceded to be due." ( 1 A1n. J ur. sec. G-l-, 
page 251) 
• ·Not infrequently though a clai1n is unliqui-
dated, or the subjeet of a bona fide and reason-
able disputP, it is conceded that at least a certain 
a1nount is due. It 1night seem that in paying this 
conceded part of the claim, or any less0r amoun~t, 
the debtor 1ras 1nerely do£ng 1Dhat he was pre-
~riously bound to do, and that, therefore, the pay-
Inent could not be valid consideration and some 
courts so hold. The· majority, however, looks at 
an unliquidated or dispUJted claim as a ,,·hole .and 
so looking at it, does not atten1pt to set a value 
upon it, or to define the extent of the debtor's 
legal obligation. Accordingly, such a claim is 
deal1t y,·ith as a horse is dealt y,,.ith, as something 
the adeqllacy of \\'"hich as consideration \\'"ill not 
be n1easured; and the payment of the an1ount 
ad1uittedl~r due \Yill support a promise to dis-
charge the ,,,.hole clai1n." ( 1 \V"illiston on Contracts 
Ec-'\·i:.:P(l (R Yol.) Ed. p. 439) ~0P alRo 1 CJS 513. 
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Plaintiff and defendants could have agreed, when 
contracting initially, that the amount ":hich the defend-
ants would pay plaintiff for his turkeys would be $9,350.-
06 but ·they did not do so because no one knew the 
number or sales price of the turkeys nor the amount 
nor price of the feed to be fed and supplies required 
nor the amount of the charges for processing, eviscer-
ating, storage, freight, etc. So the clain1 was unliquidated 
during the time the turke·ys were being fed, killed, proces-
sed, etc. When did it become liquidated? Only when 
defendants accounted and the plaintiff accepted (agreed 
to) the accounting. Was there an acceptance of the ac-
counting prior to the execution an{delivery of the Re-
lease~ There was none. As argued in more detail below·, 
there was no time when the plaintiff was legally bound 
by the accounting until he delivered his executed Release 
and received his money. Until that moment, the obliga~ 
tion bet-\Yren the parties " .. as unliquidated. 
~This court says at the conclusion of the last long 
paragraph at the end of the opinion: 
"The payment being for the exact a111ount 
"'"hich the parties had agreed ",.as o" .. ing to plain-
tiff from the 1narketing of his 1951 turkeys, there 
"ras no consideration given for the release of any 
other liability ovred to plaintiff.'' 
As pointed out above, the authorities agree that payn1ent 
of only the portion of the rlai1n conceded by tl1e one 
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paying, is sufficient eonsideration if the claim is either 
disputed or unliquidated. The obligation bet"\veen the 
parties \\·as both unliquidated in 1nany particulars (sales 
prite of the turkeys on each of 1nany sales at varying 
prices, purchase price of the hundred odd lots of feed 
and supplies charged against this herd, the tenns of the 
contract as to defendants' right and obligation to sell, 
the a1nount charged for hauling to the plant, for kill-
ing, processing, eviscerating, storage, insurance, freight, 
ete.) and also disputed (as to the $4,000 claimed to be 
O\\~ing on the 1951 crop and as to the threats of litigation 
\\~hich \\'"ere actually 1nade by plaintiff and in1plied 1n 
the audits and the demands of the attorneys). 
1fay \Ve ask the court when the parties " had 
agreed [\\~hat amount] \vas o\ving ... " ·~ Plaintiff had not 
agreed that $9,350.06 \Yas o\ving at tl1e time he sent his 
auditor, Thir. ::\lann in to make the last examination 
\\~hich \\~as reported (Tr. 105) one month after the defend-
ants offered plaintiff the $9,350.06 in full settlement of 
··any and all claims ... of \Yhatsoever name, nature and 
description .... " There \\~as no agreen1ent until plaintiff 
aecepted defendants' offer by delivering the executed 
Release and received the cheek. Until that 1noment the 
rlaiin \Yas unliquidated. 
l~ ntil plaintiff delivered the executed release in 
exchange for the check in liquidation of "any and all 
claims ... of \Yhatsoever nan1e, nature and description"-
nntil that n1o1nent plaintiff eould have refused to agree 
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to accept the $9,350.06 as full payment. He could have 
claimed an additional $4,000 for which he is now suing 
in the fifth cause of action, or questioned the prices ob-
tained for his turkeys or the charges for feed, supplies, 
hauling, processing, eviscerating, storage, insurance, 
taxes or freight. 
Until he accepted defendants' offer by the delivery 
of the executed Release and accepted the $9,350.06, there 
\vas no liquidation of this unliquidated obligation. He 
could have gone to the Bank, signed the release and, as he 
handed it over and reached for the check, he could have 
changed his mind and refused to accept the offer to 
liquidate, by refusing to deliver the release and sued for 
the $9.350.06 and the $4,000 he no\v claims is O\Ying; or 
sued for not $9.350.06, but $20,000 or $30,000 or more. 
Could we have succesfully defended such suit by showing 
that there "Tas an agreement bet"\\'een the parties that the 
amount O"\ving "\vas $9.350.06 ~ ,,~hen did plaintiff so 
agree~ He didn't. In the illustration, he \Yas about to 
agree but he changed his n1ind and on trial \Ye \vould 
have to prove each sale and the price received therefor 
and each eharge for feed, eviscerating, taxes, freight, etc. 
And on the other hand, defendants could sho"\v any new 
calculation that reduced its obligation belo\v $9,350.06 
and the plaintiff could ~ho\\T our indebtedness \vas $1,000 
or $nO,OOO. 
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~ince the obligation \Yas unliquidated (and also 
because it "~as disputed) the pay111ent of the conceded 
part \\·as arnple consideration for the Release in bar of 
thP present action. This is in accordance with the author-
it:ic)~ ( 1 ~\1a. J ur. See. 64, p. 251; 1 -\Villiston p. 439; 1 
CJS ;)1:1) eited and quoted above. And this is true 
heeause there \Yas no agreernent liquidating the $9,330.06 
as the total arnount o\\~ing, until the offer to so agree \Yas 
accepted by the delivery of the executed release. 
SETTLEMENT OF A DISPUTED CLAilVI AS CONSIDER-
ATION FIFTH CAUSE, FOR $4,000 l\IORE THAN PAID 
The settlement of a disputed claim is generally 
recognized ns consideration for an accol'd and satisfac-
tion. 
'"Settlement of an unliquidated or disputed 
clairn, \\~here the parties are apart in good faith 
presents such consideration." Bro\vning v. Equi-
table LifP Assurance Society 9-1 Utah 532, 72 P. 
:2nd 1060 n t 1068 (emphasis added), Ashton v. 
~keen, S5 r~tah -l-89, 39 P. ~nd 1073 at 107G. 
H\\-.-here a claim is not a rnoney demand, or, 
if so, is unliquidated, or, if liquidated, there is a 
bona fide dispute as to the stun actually due, or 
a bo}1L1. fide doubt or controversy exists as to 
\Yhether anything is due then an accord and satis-
faction rnay be established and held binding, al-
tllo-__:_gh the:L .. e is a payment of a surn less than that 
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claimed by the creditor or even a sum less than 
that which, on an actu~l computation, might be 
found due to the creditor." 1 Am. Jur. Section 
60, p·. 249. 
"A disputed claim may be either liquidated or 
unliquidated. A claim of A against B for $5, 
admittedly lent by A to B, but concerning the 
payment of which there is a dispute, is a disputed 
claim; but the amount of the clain1, if it exists 
at all, is fixed. As the amount of an unliquidated 
clain1 is unknown, and as either the existence 
or the amount of a disputed claim is unkno"\\rn, 
\vhether a claim is unliquidated or disputed, it 
con1es under the rule generally applicable to con-
siderrution, that the la,,r, \\~here it can avoid doing 
so, "rill not atten1pt to put a value on a consider-
ation agreed upon by the parties. The surren-
der of a disputed claiin, \\Thether unliquidated 
or liquidated, if the dispute is honest and not 
obviously frivolous is, therefore, consideration 
"Thich the la ''"' cannot a tte1npt to value. Accord-
ingly, any sun1 given and accepted as consider-
ation for an agreement to discharge a claim which 
is unliquidated or the subject of bona fide and 
reasonable dispute is sufficient eonsideration." 
1 Williston on Conrtraets (1936 Ed) p. ±37 and 
438. See Fuller Y. 1'01~11\ 138 N.\T. 231, 33 N.E. 
10i34. 
The plaintiff received the pa~r1nent of $9,350.06 but 
no\V claims (in the fifth cause of action of the ease at 
bar) that $4,000 1nore is O\Ying. In other \\~orJs, plaintiff 
is claiming that the an1oun t o\ved \\Tas not $9,350.06 but 
$13,350.0(). Defendants offered and 11laintiff accepted 
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$9,:350.06 in full payment of this disputed claim. The 
release \\·a~ given to evidence the accord and satisfaction 
of thi~ di~puted claim. 
Courts have al,vays encouraged men to settle their 
diffprencPs 'vithout court assistance if possible. The 
relea~e in the case at bar 'vas such a settlement, one 
entered into advisedly - vvhile the plaintiff's t'vo at-
torneys looked on. The release should be upheld. 
'"The payment and acceptance of a lesser 
amount than is claimed by a creditor may con-
stitute a good accord and satisfaction of the 'vhole 
claim, vvhere it is unliquidated or in dispute, 
even though the creditor 'vas not botmd to make 
any· reduction in his claim, or the amount paid 
is no more than the debtor concedes to be due." 
1 C.JS 512. 
In vie'v of the claim for $4,000 additional on the fifth 
cause of action, it is inescapable that the amount ovving 
on the 1951 crop \\Tas in dispute. Because it was in 
dispute, the payn1ent of the $9,350.06 and the acceptance 
of it \\Tas sufficient consideration for the Release and the 
~a1ne should be upheld and the judgment of the lo,ver 
eourt, sustained. 
THIS COURl.''S REVERSAL IS TOO BROAD 
This court concludes that the Release applies only 
to the 1951 crop. 
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" ... the release 'vas only of liability arising out 
of rthe 1951 marketing of turkeys" (Third line 
from bottom of the third paragraph from the 
end of the judgment of February 9, 1961). 
If the Release applied to 1951, then the discharge 
claimed by defendants applied to the debt sued on in the 
fifth cause of action. There it is claimed that $4,000 
more is owing on the 1951 crop than was paid. If, as 
held by this court, the Release applied only to the 1951 
crop, it still 'vas a release of liability for that crop and a 
bar to the fifth cause. 
_It is submitted that the judgment of this court should 
sustain the court below so far as concerns the fifth cause 
of action. 
It is respectfully submitted that: 
1. The judgment of the lo,Yer court should be sus-
tained because 
a. If there is ambiguity in a release from ''any and 
all debts ... of \\'"ha tsoever nan1e, nature and description'' 
it is cleared up by tl1e exception "\Yhich follo,vs but does 
not exclude any clailns for prior years. 
b. If resort need be to conten1poraneous \\~ritings, 
they are before the court in the other letters ad1nitted by 
plaintiff. 
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c. Thl\re is additional consideration for the Release 
~ince giving the Inultiple-payee check and making the 
funds inunediatPly available without a showing by the 
~;pcond 1nortgagee of its interest and without requiring 
litigation through suing both the bank and plantiff and 
paying the money into court. 
d. The payn1ent of the conceded part of a disputed 
or unliquidated claim is consideration for the Release. 
e. The settlement of a disp.uted claim is considera-
tion for the Release. 
f. The settlement of an unliquidated claim is consid-
Pration for the Release. 
g. The holding that the Release applied only to the 
1~)51 crop and the reversal of the judgment sustaining 
Release as to the 1931 crop are inconsistent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
IRWIN ·CLAWSON 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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